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Abstract: Understanding how policy can affect university participation is important for understanding how 
governments can promote human capital accumulation. In this paper, we estimate the separate impacts of 
tuition fees and maintenance grants on the decision to enter university in the UK. We use Labour Force 
Survey data covering 1992–2007, a period of important variation in higher education finance, which saw the 
introduction of up-front tuition fees and the abolition of maintenance grants in 1998, followed some eight 
years later by a shift to higher deferred fees and the reinstatement of maintenance grants.  We create a 
pseudo-panel  of  university  participation  of  cohorts  defined  by  sex,  region  of  residence  and  family 
background, and estimate a number of different specifications on these aggregated data. Our findings show 
that tuition fees  have had a  significant negative  effect on participation,  with a £1,000  increase in  fees 
resulting in a decrease in participation of 3.9 percentage points, which equates to an elasticity of –0.14. Non-
repayable support in the form of maintenance grants has had a positive effect on participation, with a £1,000 
increase in grants resulting in a 2.6 percentage point increase in participation, which equates to an elasticity 
of 0.18. These findings are comparable to, but of a slightly lower magnitude than, those in the related US 
literature.  
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1.  Introduction 
Understanding  how  policy  can  affect  university  (college)  participation  is  important  for 
understanding how governments can promote human capital accumulation. The subject of how to 
finance higher education (HE) has been high on the agenda of successive UK governments since the 
1960s. The UK has moved from a situation in which the taxpayer footed the entire bill for HE, to a 
system where HE participants contribute towards the cost. Since its inception, this so-called ‘cost-
sharing’ has been plagued with controversy, with fears that it would lower university participation, 
particularly among individuals from less well-off backgrounds.  
 
The UK has seen two dramatic changes to HE finance in recent years. The first arose out of the 
1998 Teaching and Higher Education Act, whereby up-front tuition fees of £1,200 per year were 
introduced for degree courses for the first time ever, and maintenance grants, which are a non-
repayable form of support, were abolished and replaced by higher maintenance loans (though grants 
were subsequently brought back in 2004). The second set of changes occurred some eight years 
later in 2006/07, with the introduction of fees of up to £3,000 per year for all students, regardless of 
background,  and  deferrable  until  after  graduation  using  government-subsidised  fee  loans. 
Maintenance grants for the poorest students were also increased substantially at this time.  
 
This paper exploits these important changes in fees and grants over time, along with some other 
variation occurring as a result of less-publicised policy decisions,
1 to estimate the causal impact of 
tuition fees and maintenance grants on university participation. This is an important contribution to 
an ongoing debate over this issue: despite years of debate and further major policy changes  – see 
                                                 
1 Means-tested maintenance grants were frozen in nominal terms during the period 1992–98, before being abolished in 
1998/99. They were reintroduced at a maximum level of £1,040 in 2004/05. In addition, there have been a number of 
increases in means-tested maintenance loans throughout the period of analysis.   4 
Barr and Crawford (2005) – there remains little evidence on the extent to which maintenance grants 
encourage students to participate in university, or tuition fees dissuade them from doing so. Yet the 
debate  remains  active  and  controversial:  on  the  one  hand,  advocates  of  widening  participation 
oppose tuition fees and the increasing emphasis on maintenance loans over grants, claiming that this 
deters  youths  from  lower-income  backgrounds  from  going  to  university  (Sutton  Trust,  2010; 
assorted media coverage
2); on the other hand, many argue that requiring students to contribute to 
their HE costs is important for efficiency and equity reasons,  and that the wage gains associated 
with a degree mean that youths are unlikely to be put off by increases in tuition fees (Greenaway 
and Haynes, 2003; Goodman and Kaplan, 2003). Most recently, following the Browne Review (an 
independent review of tuition fee policy in the UK which reported in October 2010) ,
3 the UK’s 
coalition government increased the cap on tuition fees to £9,000 per year, to come into play in 2012. 
The increase was  highly controversial  and was  met with mass student protests,  but despite the 
ongoing controversy and debate associated with HE finance in the UK, there remains a lack of 
evidence on the causal effects of tuition fees and support on university participation. In the light of 
the new changes, it is of crucial importance to gain some understanding of the impacts of these 
policies on university participation, making this paper an important and timely contribution to the 
literature. 
 
The paper uses 16 years of data (1992–2007) on the first-year-university participation decisions of 
young people from the UK Labour Force Survey (LFS). As discussed, during this period, up-front 
means-tested tuition fees were introduced and later replaced by higher deferred fees, and means-
tested  grants  were  abolished  and  subsequently  reintroduced.  We  use  these  data  to  construct  a 
                                                 
2 For a summary, see http://www.guardian.co.uk/education/2010/oct/12/high-fees-will-deter-poor-students. 
3  The  Browne  Review  is  formally  titled  ‘Securing  a  Sustainable  Future  for  Higher  Education  in  England’  and  is 
available at http://hereview.independent.gov.uk/hereview/report/.   5 
pseudo panel data set, to deal with problems of multicollinearity and endogeneity. Our estimates 
suggest  that  tuition  fees  have  a  significant  adverse  effect  on  university  participation,  whilst 
maintenance grants have a positive impact. In particular, we find robust evidence that a £1,000 
increase in fees results in a 3.9 percentage point decrease in university participation, while a £1,000 
increase in grants results in a 2.6 percentage point increase in participation. These findings, which 
survive a battery of robustness checks, are comparable to, but of a slightly lower magnitude than, 
those reported in the US literature (Dynarski, 2000, 2003; Kane, 1995). 
 
Understanding the link between university participation and HE finance is also important from a 
public spending perspective. Despite the increasing share of the financial burden borne by students, 
UK government spending on the HE system continues to grow – in 2009/10, the estimated spend 
was £1,050m on maintenance grants, £722m on student fee loans and £610m on maintenance loans
4 
– and has reached ‘unsustainable’ levels according to the Browne Review (2010, p.56). But little 
evidence exists as  to whether and to  what extent these subsidies have an impact on university 
participation.  
 
Separating  out  the  effects  of  fees  and  grants  on  university  participation  is  also  important  for 
policymakers going forward. Historically, policymakers in the UK have introduced packages of 
reforms  affecting  both  major  elements  of  HE  finance  –  maintenance  grants  and  tuition  fees. 
However, if, as is currently the case, policymakers favour adjusting one element of HE finance 
more than others (the forthcoming changes to the system in 2012 will involve very large increases 
                                                 
4 All in 2009 prices. Sources: Student grant figures – Student Loans Company, Statistical First Release, 06/2009, table 
3. Maintenance loan and fee loan figures – DIUS Annual Report 2009, annex 1, table 11. (This does not represent the 
amount of money lent to students, but the future cost of subsidising and writing off student loans issued in that year as 
well as management of the student loans stock.)   6 
in tuition fees, but relatively small increases in grants), evidence on how this may affect university 
participation – which is what we provide in this paper – is of key importance. This sets the paper 
apart from previous work relating to the UK, which focuses on responses of university participation 
to an overall set of reforms, most notably the 1998 reforms, rather than to the separate elements of 
the reforms  (fees  and  grants). Moreover,  previous  work  tends  to  look  more  at  the  relationship 
between  family  background  and  participation  around  the  time  of  the  reforms,  rather  than  at 
establishing a direct link between fees / grants and university participation, as we do in this paper. 
Blanden  and  Machin  (2004),  for  instance,  examine  university  participation  and  attainment  by 
parental income before and after the 1998 reforms, and find that both participation in full-time 
education (at  age 19) and  degree  attainment  (at age 23)  became more closely linked to  family 
income  as  university  participation  expanded  in  the  1980s  and  1990s.  However,  they  find  no 
evidence that these gaps in participation and attainment were related to the cost of HE. Subsequent 
work by Blanden and Machin (2008) indicates that the link between degree attainment and family 
income, while still strong, was static for those obtaining a degree between 1993 and 2003. We 
contribute  to  the  debate  by  untangling  the  separate  impacts  of  grants  and  fees  on  university 
participation.  
 
Closely related to our work is the sizeable body of US literature estimating the causal effects of 
grants and fees on university participation. Kane (1994) exploits between- and within-state variation 
in  US  public  spending  on  tuition  fees  to  estimate  the  impact  of  tuition  fees  on  university 
participation.  He  finds  that  a  $1,000  increase  in  tuition  fees  results  in  a  3.7  percentage  point 
decrease in attendance amongst black 18- to 19-year-olds. In a later paper (Kane, 1995), he again 
finds evidence of reductions in university participation for 18- to 19-year-olds due to increased fees, 
with a $1,000 increase in fees leading to a 2.4 percentage point decrease in participation. Hemelt 
and Marcotte (2008) exploit significant variation in tuition fees within US institutions and find 
estimates of a similar magnitude to Kane’s 1995 finding.   7 
 
Regarding the effects of financial support, Dynarski (2000) finds that Georgia’s HOPE Scholarship, 
a merit-aid programme, had a positive impact on students: a $1,000 increase in aid resulted in a 4 
percentage point increase in university participation. A later paper (Dynarski, 2003) exploits a one-
off policy change whereby financial aid was withdrawn from children with a deceased, disabled or 
retired father,  finding  that the reform  reduces  university participation by 3.6 percentage points. 
Kane  (1995)  also  looks  at  the  impact  of  the  Pell  Grant  aid  system,  finding  no  impact  on 
participation, while Seftor and Turner (2002) find a small impact of Pell Grant eligibility of 0.7 
percentage points per $1,000 of aid (although of a restricted sample of mature students).  
 
These  results  suggest  an  important  role  for  tuition  fees  and  grants  in  university  participation 
decisions. However, they all relate to the US context, which is a unique setting in terms of the high 
levels of university fees; indeed, it is hard to think that they can be informative a priori about 
different, non-US, settings. In addition, these studies relate to specific groups of individuals, as seen 
above. Another feature is that they consider either the effect of fees or the effect of support, but not 
both in the same setting. In this paper, on the other hand, we can benchmark the effects of both 
grants  and  fees;  moreover,  we  do  this  on  a  representative  sample  of  individuals.  Also,  to  our 
knowledge, our paper is the first to examine the role of fees and support in a different setting, the 
UK. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides more background on the two main sets of HE 
finance reforms to take place in the UK, in 1998 and 2006. Section 3 describes the data used in the 
analysis, while Section 4 describes the methodology used to estimate the separate effects of fees and 
grants on university participation. Section 5 presents the main findings of this analysis and includes 
a battery of robustness tests. Section 6 concludes.  
   8 
2.  HE Finance in the UK, 1960–2007 
The UK HE sector has undergone a massive expansion in recent decades. Student volumes have 
increased dramatically, rising from around 50,000 full-time equivalent (FTE) students in the 1960s 
to  400,000  by  2007/08,  as  illustrated  in  Figure  1.  This  large  increase  in  university  attendance 
occurred  intermittently  and  for  various  reasons,  such  as  the  conversion  of  35  polytechnics  to 
universities  following  the  1992  Higher  Education  Act,  and  the  introduction  of  the  General 
Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE) which significantly improved school staying-on rates
5 – 
see  Wyness  (2010)  and  Blanden,  Gregg  &  Machin  (2003).  It  was,  however,  not  matched  by 
increases in university funding, so by 1997/98 the HE sector was in financial crisis: funding per 
FTE student had fallen to a historic low of £4,850
6 (from £8,000 per student at the end of the 
1980s).
7 Moreover, the gap  in university participation  between rich and poor was very wide in 
comparison with other developed countries (Barr and Crawford, 1998), and there were concerns 
that it was growing even wider (Blanden, Gregg and Machin, 2005). 
                                                 
5 The previous system of O levels tended to impose a cap on how many people could pass the exam, while the GCSE 
reform meant that anyone could achieve the top grade. The system moved away from pure examination assessment to a 
combination of exams and coursework, making top grades more accessible. It is generally agreed that this reform led to 
an increase in staying-on rates and, in turn, to an increase in university participation. For a full discussion, see Blanden, 
Gregg & Machin (2003). 
6 Note that all figures from this point on are expressed in 2006 prices unless otherwise stated. 
7 The authors are grateful to Vincent Carpentier, of the Institute of Education, University of London, for providing these 
figures.    9 
Figure 1: Degree accepts (volume) by academic year 
 
Source:  All  UK-domiciled  HE  students  (Higher  Education  Statistics  Agency  –  HESA).  Full-time  equivalent  data 
represent the institution’s assessment of the full-time equivalence of the student instance during the reporting academic 
year.  
 
This led to the first of two major policy reforms in the UK, ‘the 1998 reforms’.
8 The second major 
policy reform followed some eight years on, in 2006.
9 The key changes in both  reforms are now 
described. 
 
2.1  The 1998 Reforms 
These reforms saw the introduction, for the first time ever in the UK, of up-front means-tested 
tuition fees, of £1,200, affecting all but the least well-off students, or just over half of the student 
population as of 1998. They also resulted in the abolition of maintenance grants from 1999 onwards 
                                                 
8 These were the result of the Dearing Report, formally known as ‘The Report of the National Committee of Inquiry 
into Higher Education’, available at https://bei.leeds.ac.uk/Partners/NCIHE/. 
9 As a robustness check, we limit the sample to pre-2006 in Section 5. We find no major differences in the parameter 
estimates.   10 
(preceded by their halving in 1998), also affecting just over half of all students.
10 In an implicit 
attempt by policymakers to offset these adverse changes, maintenance loans were increased: the 
increase in loans was of similar value to the reduction in the grant (for those formerly eligible for 
grants) and to the increase in fees (for those liable to the new fees).
11 This was an indirect attempt 
by policymakers to leave students no worse off in terms of up-front support than before the reforms, 
as these loans could be channelled towards fees or put towards living costs.
  
 
2.2  The 2006 Reforms 
By  2004,  university  participation  had  increased  significantly,  but  there  remained  concern  that 
representation of the lowest socio-economic groups had barely changed in relative terms (though it 
had risen in absolute terms – see Mayhew, Deer and Dua (2004)). There were also concerns that the 
student support package remained too low to cover the costs of university (Barr, 2004), and that UK 
universities were still underfunded compared with the rest of the OECD, compromising their quality 
and competitiveness (Greenaway and Haynes, 2003). A new set of reforms, arising out of the 2004 
                                                 
10 However, grants had been frozen in nominal terms throughout the 1990s, so their real value had been eroding rapidly 
– so much so that in the period before their abolition they were, at a maximum of £980, too low to cover living costs 
(estimated at £6,890 per year excluding tuition fees, for a student living away from home and outside London (NUS, 
2003)).  
11  Loans also  moved from being mortgage -style to income-contingent, with this change fully phased in by 1999 
(Goodman and Kaplan, 2003; Barr, 2004).    11 
Higher Education Act, came into effect from the academic year 2006/07
12 to address these issues. 
This is the HE system that is in place at the time of writing.
13  
 
One important change concerned tuition fees: i nstead of being payable up front, all fees are now 
deferrable until after graduation, with loans available at a zero real interest rate, repayable according 
to income (at 9% above a threshold of £15,000). Unlike its predecessor, the current fee, which could 
be up to £3,000 per year,
14 is not means-tested – see Dearden, Fitzsimons and Goodman (2004) and 
Dearden et al. (2008) for more details. So, like the 1998 reforms, adverse changes to fees were 
offset by changes to loans, with the link being made more explicit through the introduction of fee 
loans. Another change to occur as a result of the 2004 Act was an increase in maintenance grants of 
up  to  £2,700  for  the  poorest  students.
15  Maintenance loans remained pretty much unchanged, 
though they were reduced slightly for students who saw a grant increase. 
 
These three elements of the HE finance system are shown in Tables 1–3, which set out the values of 
grants, fees and loans respectively, for the two major ‘reform’ years just discussed as well as for 
1992/93 (the first year in our estimation period, and also during the time at which maintenance 
                                                 
12 As previously mentioned, maintenance grants were reintroduced in 2004/05 as part of this Act, though they were 
increased substantially in 2006/07. 
13 During writing the Government announced that the fee cap will be raised to £9,000 per year (in 2012 prices) in 
2012/13, and the majority of universities that have announced their planned fees for 2012/13 have opted to charge the 
full £9,000 fee. 
14 In practice, almost  all universities charge the full fee. The fee cap will be raised to £9,000 (in 2012 prices) in 
2012/13.(see footnote 13). 
15 Following their abolition in 1999/00, maintenance grants had been reintroduced in 2004/05 at £1,040 pe r year. Note 
too that the poorest students also benefit from bursaries under these reforms (at least £300 if the full fee is charged).   12 
grants  were  being frozen) and 2004/05  (when maintenance grants  were reintroduced after  their 
abolition in 1999/00), for different parental income levels. 
Table 1: Maintenance grant eligibility by parental income  
GRANTS  Academic year 
Parental income  1992/93  1998/99  2004/05  2006/07 
≤£10,000  2,989  949  1,040  2,700 
£20,000  179  949  248  2,283 
£30,000  0  569  0  832 
£40,000  0  0  0  0 
≥£50,000  0  0  0  0 
 
Table 2: Tuition fee levels by parental income  
FEES  Academic year 
Parental income  1992/93  1998/99  2004/05  2006/07 
≤£10,000  0  0  0  3,000 
£20,000  0  373  0  3,000 
£30,000  0  1,172  980  3,000 
£40,000  0  1,172  1,196  3,000 
≥£50,000  0  1,172  1,196  3,000 
 
Table 3: Maintenance and fee loan eligibility by parental income 
LOANS  Academic year 
Parental income  1992/93  1998/99  2004/05  2006/07
a 
≤£10,000  943  3,204  4,260  6,555 
£20,000  943  3,204  4,260  6,555 
£30,000  943  2,884  4,260  7,005 
£40,000  943  2,403  3,262  6,549 
≥£50,000  943  2,403  3,199  6,305 
a  Includes  £3,000  fee  loan  (introduced  in  2006/07).  Maintenance  loan  amounts  depend  on  whether  the  student  is 
attending a London or non-London university, and whether (s)he is living at home or away from home; the figures in 
this table refer to non-home, outside London. 
 
The two sets of reforms just discussed highlight two important features of the HE finance system. 
First, the three main elements of the system – grants, fees and loans – are all highly dependent on   13 
parental income.
16 Second, the three elements are highly interdependent. In particular, as we have 
seen, loans have commonly been used as a tool to offset adverse changes to grants and fees. These 
two features are clear from Figures 2–4, which show fee liability and grant and loan eligibility over 
time. First, each of these figures represents a different parental income group (for instance, Figure 2 
covers individuals from low-income families, who were eligible for maximum grants in the 1990s 
and  were  not  liable  to  means-tested  tuition  fees  between  1998  and  2005).
17  Second,  the 
interdependence is evident from the inverse relationship between grants and loans in Figures 2 and 
3; and from the similar upward shifts in fees and loans from 1998 onwards in Figures 3 and 4 as 
loans are extended to cover fees. However, we should note that towards the end of the period,  the 
three elements of the system move in the same direction, unlike in the pre-2006 period. 
Figure 2: Fee liability and grant and loan eligibility: low-income individuals 
 
 
                                                 
16 The exception is deferred fees, which were introduced in 2006 and are payable by all students. 
17 For ease of illustration, we present these figures by income group. ‘Low-income’ students are those eligible for full 
grants, when in place, and not liable to means-tested fees, when in place (parental income less than approximately 
£17,500 p.a.). ‘Medium-income’ students are those eligible for partial grants and liable to partial means-tested fees, 
when in place (parental income between about £17,500 and £37,500). ‘High-income’ students are never eligible for 
grants, but always liable to means-tested fees, when in place (parental income above approximately £37,500 p.a.).   14 
Figure 3: Fee liability and grant and loan eligibility: medium-income individuals 
 
 
Figure 4: Fee liability and grant and loan eligibility: high-income individuals 
 
 
This results in a high degree of collinearity between fees, grants and loans in all periods, making it 
difficult to separate out their effects within a standard regression framework. We instead estimate 
their effects by aggregating the data and converting them to a pseudo -panel – see Deaton (1985), 
Propper, Rees and Green (2001), Verbeek and Vella (2005) and Adda and Banks (2008). We come 
back to this in Section 4. 
 
Before proceeding, note that, as previously discussed, our parameters of interest are maintenance 
grants and tuition fees. Though the third element of HE finance – loans (for maintenance and, from 
2006,  for  fees)  –  is  important,  we  do  not  attempt  to  estimate  its  causal  effects  on  university   15 
participation, though we do control for it throughout the analysis. One reason for this is that, as we 
see from Figures 2–4, there is considerably less variation in loans across income groups than in fees 
and grants, resulting in considerably less statistical power. Moreover, loan take-up is a complex 
decision-making process and its modelling is beyond the scope of this paper.
18 For simplicity, we 
control for the up-front value of loans in all specifications, implicitly assuming that individuals are 
present-oriented and discount the future completely, and we create one variable for loans, which 
includes just maintenance loans before 2006 and both fee and maintenance loans from 2006.
19  
 
A final point to make is that our period of interest (1992 -2007) was one in  which participation, 
whilst growing, was still relatively low, and in general there were no supply-side constraints: those 
who achieved the entry  requirements for a degree were likely to secure a place at university. In 
more recent years however, demand has significantly exceeded supply, due in part to the economic 
crisis and resultant lack of jobs for school -leavers, meaning that any extension of our analysis to 
later years would have to take supply-side constraints into account. 
 
3.  Data 
The objective of the paper is to estimate the effects of grants and fees on individuals’ likelihood of 
entering university; our sample of interest is thus youths of university-entry age. More specifically, 
it consists of those eligible for their first year of university, who are subject to the HE finance 
                                                 
18 The most recent government statistics show a take-up figure of 80% for maintenance loans (see  Student Loans 
Company, Statistical First Release, 06/2009, table 4), despite them being a very attractive form of borrowing (debt is 
frozen at a zero real interest rate, and repayment is upon graduation and contingent on income, currently set at 9% of 
earnings above £15,000). Unfortunately, no information is available on the types of individuals who do or do not take 
up their loans. 
19 For repayment purposes, fee and maintenance loans are treated as the same ‘income-contingent repayment’ loan by 
the Student Loan Company (indeed, they are treated as one loan on loan statements from the Student Loan Company).   16 
policy in place at the time of their year of entry (as a rule, subsequent policy changes do not affect 
them). We take these to be people who are of the appropriate ‘academic age’ for the first year of 
university, as determined by date of birth, regardless of educational attainment to date. Our paper 




For these individuals, we require knowledge of parental income in order to calculate the amount of 
fees, grants and loans they would be liable to / eligible for were they to attend university; since we 
do not observe take-up of grants, we model individuals’ behaviour based on what they are eligible 
for, i.e. ‘intention to treat’. 
 
The Labour Force Survey (LFS) is the only UK data set containing information on young people 
living at home in the year before they are eligible for university, along with their date of birth
21 and 
their parents’ income, and their university decision a year later, as well as adequate sample sizes to 
allow for robust estimation.
22 This is a survey following around 60,000 households every quarter. It 
has  both  cross -sectional  and  longitudinal  elements,  with  households  interviewed  for  five 
consecutive quarters (i.e. waves 1–5, so wave 1 and wave 5 are one year apart) and then removed 
from the panel and replaced. We use LFS data from 1992 through 2007 in all that follows. 
                                                 
20 This is because we are unable to ascertain which HE policy individuals who have already left school are potentially 
subject to: for those in university, we do not know what year they began studying and hence what HE finance policies 
they fall under; for those not in education, it is more difficult to observe parental income, as they are less likely to be 
living at home in the previous period and thus we are less likely to observe their parents.  
21 Note that, for some years, date of birth is only available in special-access versions of the LFS. 
22 For various reasons, neither the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) nor the Family Resources Survey (FRS) 
fulfilled these criteria. The BHPS was found to have inadequate sample sizes, while the FRS does not collect 
information on those attending university but living outside the home (except those in halls of residence).   17 
We use these data to create an accurate picture of university participation and potential HE finance 
for every individual in the following way. In order to calculate the levels of fees, grants and loans 
that all individuals are liable to / eligible for (regardless of whether they go to university or not), we 
need to observe parental income the year before the person is eligible to attend university (since this 
is  how  means-testing  would  be  carried  out),  calculating  an  individual’s  liability  to  fees  and 
eligibility for grants and loans  from the government’s means-testing formulae, which are based 
purely on parental income. The advantage of the LFS is that we observe households exactly one 
year apart (waves 1 and 5), so for people of university age in wave 5 (whether studying, working or 
not), we can observe parental income a year before (in wave 1). This is 25% of our sample. For 
people of university age in wave 1, or those of university age in wave 5 (again, whether studying, 
working or not) whose parental income in wave 1 is missing (the latter account for a significant 
proportion of our sample up to 1996 since until this time parental income data were only collected 
in wave 5), we only observe parental incomes in the current year, so we use these and adjust for 
inflation.
23 This is 54% of our sample. For people of university age but living away from home and 
not in a hall of residence (10%), we estimate fee liability and grant and loan eligibility on the basis 
of their own characteristics
24 and year of eligibility for university. There is a final group who do live 
at home but for whom parental income is missing (11%). We omit this group.  
 
An important point to note here is that we actually only observe parental earnings, as opp osed to 
parental income, since this is the only measure available in the LFS. We therefore use earnings as a 
proxy  for  income.  This,  combined  with  our  imputation  methods  above,  results  in  potential 
                                                 
23 We test the robustness of this approach post-1996 by imputing lagged income in this way, for those whose income we 
observe in both waves, and measuring the correlation. We find the imputed and real incomes for wave 1 to be highly 
correlated, at around 0.85, so we are confident in this imputation method. 
24 Sex, ethnicity, GCSE attainment. Note that, obviously, we have no parental characteristics for these individuals.   18 
measurement error in our three elements of HE finance, as well as in our parental income variable 
itself. We will discuss our method of dealing with this possible measurement error in Section 4. 
 
The sample is restricted to England, Wales and Northern Ireland, thus excluding Scotland. This is 
because Scotland experienced a significant departure from UK HE policy in 2000 and, as part of 
this, introduced an endowment of around £2,200 per student, to be paid upon graduation. This 
renders the Scottish system very different from the system that covers the rest of the UK.
25  
 
The outcome variable is ‘attending first year of university, degrees only’. The average participation 
rate across the sample is 16.4% of 18- to 19-year-olds, though this varies considerably by parental 
income,  as  shown  in  Figure  5,  with  an  average  of  12.2%  of  individuals  from  low-income 
backgrounds studying for a degree compared with 30.4% from high-income backgrounds.
26 This is 
consistent with the findings of Blanden and Machin (2004), who examine participation by parental 
income in the period before  and after the 1998 HE reforms and find significant differences in 
participation between those from low- and high-income backgrounds.
27 Their analysis also shows 
that the gap in degree attainment between individuals from low - and high-income backgrounds 
widened between the early 1980s and late 1990s (earlier than the timescale of this analysis), though 
later work (Blanden and Machin, 2008) suggests the decline in social mobility may have flattened 
out. Indeed, Figure 5 clearly illustrates that the gap in univ ersity participation between those from 
                                                 
25 In 2000, Scotland abolished tuition fees. Ideally, this policy shift could be exploited to assess the impact of fees, 
using difference-in-difference analysis over time and country (England versus Scotland). However, as explained, at the 
same  time  Scotland  introduced  a  number  of  other  policy  changes,  such  as  the  reintroduction  of  grants  and  the 
endowment fee, resulting in the lack of a ‘clean’ policy change. 
26 We use the income groups defined in Section 2.2 (see footnote 17) in the descriptive statistics. 
27 Their analysis focuses on degree acquisition at age 23, and controls for background characteristics, so is not directly 
comparable to Figure 5.   19 
low- and high-income households (and particularly between low- and medium-income households) 
has  been  narrowing  since  the  mid-1990s.  The  figure  also  emphasises  that  those  from  different 
parental income backgrounds have differing trends in participation over time, meaning that it will 
be important to control for this in our modelling. 
Figure 5: University participation over time by parental income group 
 
 
Table 4 shows summary statistics and sample means for the outcome variable and control variables 
used in the analysis (at the individual, rather than aggregate level). The control variables include 
ethnicity (a binary variable taking the value 1 if the individual is white and 0 otherwise), youth’s 
prior educational attainment (measured as having 5 or more  good GCSEs, less than 5 GCSEs or no 
GCSEs),
28  education  level of the  more  highly  educated parent (measured in  four  categories of 
attainment  using  the  National  Qualification  Framework  of  both  e ducational  and  vocational 
qualifications), current  parental  income  (this  is  the  sum  of  both  parents’  annual  income  in  the 
current year, i.e. when the youth is eligible for university at age 18–19) and region (18 regional 
                                                 
28 A variable measuring number of A levels is available in the LFS data set, but only from 1993 onwards, and it is 
limited in granularity to zero, or one or more. Furthermore, A-level attainment can be considered endogenous to the 
university participation decision. For these reasons, GCSE or equivalent is chosen as a more robust measure of prior 
educational attainment.   20 
dummies in total, representing the 16 major regions of England and one for each of Wales and 
Northern Ireland). Note that region represents the region of home domicile of the individual.
29  
Table 4: Summary statistics (LFS 1992–2007)
a 
  Mean  Standard deviation 
University participation  16.36  36.99 
Sex     
  Male  0.5073  0.50 
  Female  0.4927  0.50 
Ethnicity     
  White  86.19  34.50 
  Non-white  9.09  28.75 
  Missing  4.72  21.20 
Youth’s education     
  5 or more GCSEs (A*–C)
b  50.10  50.00 
  1–4 GCSEs (A*–C)  26.69  44.23 
  No GCSEs  21.19  40.86 
  Missing  2.02  14.08 
Parental education
c     
  NVQ level 4 or above  26.29  44.02 
  NVQ level 3  22.11  41.50 
  NVQ level 2  12.27  32.81 
  NVQ level 1 or below  27.04  44.42 
  Missing  12.29  32.84 
Current parental income (£)  21,602  23,730 
Region     
  England  88.91  31.40 
  Wales  5.76  23.30 
  Northern Ireland  5.33  22.46 
Grant (£)  1,114  1,153 
Fee (£)  585  1,008 
Sample size  27,485   
Notes: Data in this table are based on the individual-level sample of 27,485 individuals. 
a Sample shown is all those eligible for first year of university. 
b This is the expected level of attainment by the end of compulsory education in the UK. 
c This is the education level of the more highly educated
 parent. 
 
                                                 
29 So students and non-students living in a region away from home have their home domicile as their region, rather than 
the region of the institution  they are attending / place they are  working. Note, in this respect, that HE finance is 
dependent on country of domicile rather than on country of institution.    21 
The final sample size is 27,485 youths aged 18–19. Note that the sample is evenly split between 
males and females, around 50% of the sample have attained five or more good (A*–C grades) 
GCSEs
30 and the level of parental education is quite diverse. 
 
4.  Estimation 
The analysis uses 16 years of repeated cross-sections from 1992 through 2007. The overall sample 
size  is  27,485  individuals.  To  estimate  the  parameters  of  the  model,  we  aggregate  university 
participation by region of residence, sex, level of parental education and time, to create a pseudo-
panel. This helps overcome problems of multicollinearity as well as endogeneity. Regarding the 
former, we saw from Section 2 that the three main elements of the HE finance package – fees, loans 
and grants – are all highly collinear with each other and with parental income. This results in over-
sensitivity of the coefficient estimates to small changes in the model, making it econometrically 
difficult to identify their separate effects using a framework such as equation (1), where university 
participation of individual i in period t, Pit, is modelled as a function of fees (F), grants (G), loans 
(L),  background  characteristics  (X),  regional  dummies,  an  individual-specific  effect  and  a  time 
trend.
31  
Pit  =   + 1Fit + 2Git + 3Lit + Xit + ρr + t + fi + it  (1) 
A common method for dealing with this problem is to transform the data in such a way as to 
remove the high degree of collinearity amongst the variables, which is what the aggregation does. 
Regarding endogeneity, a concern is that unobserved individual-specific effects are correlated with 
explanatory variables of interest – in particular, with parental income, and thus fees, loans and 
                                                 
30 This is the expected level of attainment at the end of compulsory education in the UK. 
31 In an initial stage, we experimented with a number of specifications, and found the coefficients to be highly sensitive 
to small changes in the model specification and to the inclusion or exclusion of particular variables.   22 
grants – and also affect the outcome of interest. For this reason, we group individuals into cells, or 
‘cohorts’ (defined below), which tends to  homogenise the individual effects  among individuals 
grouped in the same cell, thus creating a pseudo-panel of groups of individuals sharing common 
characteristics. The averages within these cells are treated as observations in a pseudo-panel to 
which standard panel-data techniques can be applied (Deaton, 1985). This procedure also reduces 
the biasing effects of measurement error, which, as we saw in Section 3, is a concern regarding 
parental income. A further advantage is that since a new sample of individuals is taken in each 
period, the use of a pseudo-panel greatly reduces the effect of attrition on parameter estimates. 
 
In order to construct cells for the pseudo-panels, we aggregate university participation by region, 
sex, level of parental education and time. Specifically, we have: (i) 18 regions;
32 (ii) two sexes; (iii) 
five levels of education of the more highly educated parent: level 4 or above, level 3, level 2, level 1 
or below, missing
33; and (iv) 16 years. So, for example, we take all 18- to 19-year-old males whose 
more  highly educated parent is  level 4 or above in  Merseyside in 1992, and compute average 
university participation amongst them. So we use 18 regions, two sexes and five parental education 
groups to form cells, or cohorts, that we follow over time. As Verbeek (2007) discusses, cells 
should be defined as groups whose explanatory variables change differentially over time: this is the 
case for a key explanatory variable in our model – GCSE results – which varies markedly over time 
by parental education background, region and sex. The cell sizes, which are shown in Table 5, vary 
from 1,566 to 4,020 households, with a mean of 2,749, and result in a balanced panel of 10 groups, 
                                                 
32 1 Tyne and Wear, 2 rest of North East, 3 Greater Manchester, 4 Merseyside, 5 rest of North West, 6 South Yorkshire, 
7 West Yorkshire, 8 rest of Yorkshire & Humberside, 9 East Midlands, 10 West Midlands metropolitan county, 11 rest 
of West Midlands, 12 Eastern, 13 Inner London, 14 Outer London, 15 South East, 16 South West, 17 Wales, 18 
Northern Ireland. 
33 Those with ‘missing parental education’ are living independently and thus have no parental information.   23 
in 18 regions, over 16 years, or 2,880 cells in total. We treat the averages within these cells as 
observations in a panel. 
Table 5: Pseudo-panel number of cells  
Group   Description  Frequency 
1  male, parental education level 4 or above  3,795 
2  male, parental education level 3  3,199 
3  male, parental education level 2  1,806 
4  male, parental education level 1 or below  4,020 
5  male, missing parental education  1,124 
6  female, parental education level 4 or above  3,432 
7  female, parental education level 3  2,877 
8  female, parental education level 2  1,566 
9  female, parental education level 1 or below  3,411 
10  female, missing parental education  2,255 
Total    27,485 
 
The equation we estimate is 
Pct  =   + 1Fct + 2Gct + 3Lct + Xct + g(t) + fc + ct  (2) 
where Pct represents the mean university participation rate in each of the cells. Fct, Gct and Lct 
denote respectively the average fee, grant and loan of that cell in period t, for t = 1992,...,2007. The 
remaining explanatory variables are contained in Xct and are as shown in Table 4, again at their 
mean levels by cell. The presence of cell-specific unobserved heterogeneity that is fixed over time 
is captured by fc, while ct represents an iid error term. Note also that a linear time trend is allowed 
for in the model, g(t), which varies by parental education group. 
 
5.  Findings 
In this section, we present the results of our preferred specification, accompanied by a number of 
robustness tests. As a reminder, our parameters of interest are tuition fees and grants, although, as 
previously described, we also control for maintenance and fee loans in all specifications.  
   24 
5.1  Main Specification 
In our preferred specification, we aggregate the data into cells on the basis of parental education, 
sex, region and time (see Section 4) to create a pseudo-panel, and estimate a fixed-effects model on 
it.  This  is  to  allow  for  time-invariant  unobserved  heterogeneity  within  cells  that  is  potentially 
correlated with the outcome variable of interest. We control for all of the background variables 
listed in Table 4, at their average value per cell, along with a linear time trend that we allow to vary 
by  cell-average  parental  education  (see  Figure  5  for  evidence  of  differing  trends  in  university 
participation over time – in that case by parental income). Our results are presented in Table 6.  
Table 6: Probability of university participation at age 18–19 
Cells created by parental education group, region, sex and time 
Dependent variable   University participation 
Grant  0.0262 
[0.010]** 
 
Fee  –0.039 
[0.015]** 
Number of cells  2,802 
Notes: Dependent variable is participation in first year of university (degrees only) at age 18–19.  
All regressions control for the socio-economic variables listed in Table 4. We also control for a linear time trend 
interacted with parental income level. 
Numbers in square brackets are standard errors. 
* Denotes statistical significance at the 10% level.  
** Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level. 
** Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level or less. 
 
The findings show that a £1,000 increase in fees results in a 3.9 percentage point decrease in first-
year-university participation, whilst  a  £1,000 increase in  grants  leads  to  a 2.6 percentage  point 
increase in participation. These coefficients are in line with, but slightly smaller than, the findings 
of Dynarski (2000, 2003) and Kane (1995), as described in Section 1, bearing in mind inflation and 
exchange rates. These coefficients translate to average elasticities of –0.14 and 0.18 for fees and 
grants respectively.    25 
The  coefficient  on  loans,  2.5  percentage  points  (not  shown  in  the  table),  is  also  of  statistical 
significance at 5%, though note that we are controlling in this specification for the up-front, non-
discounted value of loans, thus assuming that individuals discount the future completely.
34 
 
It is also reassuring to note that the explanatory variables all have the expected signs and are 
generally significant  (see Table A1 in the app endix).  Children of well educated parents (NVQ 
Levels 3 and 4) are significantly more likely to attend university than children of parents with no 
qualifications, while youths own  prior attainment is a key driver of university participation, in line 
with widely accepted theory and evidence (Heckman and Carneiro, 2003; Gorard, 2006). GCSE 
attainment has a strong positive impact on participation  – an increase from fewer than five good 
GCSEs to five or more good GCSEs results in a 25.6 percentage point increase in the probability of 
attending university, while whites are less likely than non-whites to go to university a well-known 
feature of UK HE participation, in contrast with countries such as the US – see Chowdry et al. 
(2010). 
 
5.2  Robustness  
To assess the robustness of this finding, we next estimate four different specifications of the model. 
In the first, we allow for a quadratic as well as a linear time trend, and we continue to allow it to 
vary by cell-average parental education. In the second, we omit the years in which deferred fees 
were in force (post 2005). In the third, we omit 1992, a year in which there was a sharp increase in 
university participation; and in the fourth, we omit the missing parental education group, just under 
17% of the sample. The main findings remain robust to these changes in the model specification. 
The estimates are shown in columns (1) through (4) of Table 7.  
                                                 
34 We believe that controlling for loans is important, as they have been an intrinsic part of successive governments’ HE 
finance packages. But, as previously described, we are reluctant to attach a causal interpretation to this parameter.   26 




Specification up to 




  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
grant  0.0217  0.0316  0.0253  0.0199 
  [ 0.010]**  [ 0.013]**  [ 0.010]**  [ 0.012]* 
fee  -0.0378  -0.0412  -0.0376  -0.0323 
  [ 0.015]**  [ 0.025]*  [ 0.015]**  [ 0.018]* 
No of cells  2802  2444  2629  2268 
Notes: Dependent variable is participation in first year of university (degrees only) at age 18–19.  
All regressions control for the socio-economic variables listed in Table 4. We also control for a linear time trend 
interacted with parental education level. 
Numbers in square brackets are standard errors. 
* Denotes statistical significance at the 10% level.  
** Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level. 
*** Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level or less. 
Column (1) of the Table shows estimates from the first robustness exercise, in which we allow for a 
more flexible time trend. In particular, in addition to a linear time trend, varying across parental 
education group, as in our preferred specification, we allow a quadratic time trend, again varying 
across parental education group. The results change very little. 
 
In the second robustness exercise, shown in column (2), we include data only up to 2005, the year 
before higher, deferred tuition fees came into effect. This is because by pooling years before and 
after the 2006 reforms, we are pooling together different types of fees, both up-front and deferred 
(though  see  the  discussion  on  offsetting  up-front  fees  with  loans  in  Section  2.1).  So  in  this 
specification we include only up-front fees in the analysis. The coefficient on fees remains very 
similar, and is significant at the 10% level. We also find the coefficient on grants to be similar. 
 
In our third robustness exercise, we omit data from 1992, a year in which participation rose rapidly 
due to the 1992 Further and Higher Education Act. This Act made changes in the funding and 
administration  of further  education and higher  education  within  the United  Kingdom,  most 
dramatically  by  granting  university  status  to  35  polytechnics,  and  a  number  of  other  further   27 
education institutions, thus significantly increasing the volume of university participants. Again the 
results change very little.  
 
Finally, we estimate the model using four rather than five parental education groups (level 4 or 
above, level 3, level 2, level 1 or below), thus omitting the group whose parental education is 
missing  due  to  them  living  away  from  home  (12%  of  the  sample),  to  see  whether  results  are 
sensitive to this. The estimates are of similar magnitude and are significant at the 10% level. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
Understanding  how  policy  can  affect  university  education  is  important  for  understanding  how 
governments  can  promote  human  capital  accumulation.  This  paper  exploits  historic  changes  to 
university funding policies in the UK to estimate the impact of tuition fees and maintenance grants 
on university participation. Previous work on this, which largely relates to the US, considers either 
the effect of fees or the effect of support, but not both in the same setting; moreover it considers 
specific sub-samples of individuals. In this paper on the other hand, we benchmark the effects of 
both grants and fees, and furthermore, we do this on a representative sample of individuals. Using a 
pseudo panel data set constructed from 16 years of data on first-year university participation, our 
results suggest an important role for tuition fees and grants in university participation decisions:  we 
find robust evidence that a £1,000 increase in tuition fees reduces university participation by 3.9 
percentage points, while a £1,000 increase in maintenance grants  increases participation by 2.6 
percentage points. These figures equate to an elasticity of –0.14 for fees and 0.18 for grants. These 
results are in line with those estimated in the US in a number of studies, such as Kane (1995), 
Dynarski (2003) and Hemelt and Marcotte (2008).     28 
Appendix A1 
Table A1: Probability of university participation at age 18–19 
  Marginal Effects 
Grant  0.0262 
 
[ 0.010]** 
Fee  -0.039 
  [ 0.015]** 
Loan  0.0253 
  [ 0.011]** 
Current parental income  -0.0001 
  [ 0.001] 
White  -0.1049 
  [ 0.025]*** 
GCSE / O level  0.2617 
  [ 0.019]*** 
Parental income  quartile 1 (omitted)   
   
Parental income quartile 2  0.0139 
  [ 0.024] 
Parental income quartile 3  0.0591 
  [ 0.033]* 
Parental income quartile 4  0.1114 
  [ 0.054]** 
Parental education quartile 1 × Time  -0.0007 
  0.0018] 
Parental education quartile 2 × Time  0.0015 
  [ 0.002] 
Parental education quartile 3 × Time  -0.0006 
  [ 0.002] 
Parental education quartile 4 × Time  0.0008 
  [ 0.001] 
Unemployment rate  0.0081 
 
[ 0.003]*** 
constant  -0.273 
 
[ 0.008]*** 
No of cells  2802 
Notes: Dependent variable is participation in first year of university (degrees only) at age 18–19.  
Numbers in square brackets are standard errors. 
* Denotes statistical significance at the 10% level.  
** Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level. 
*** Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level or less.   29 
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